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PUBLIC BEACHES: A REEVALUATION
Lack of public beach recreational space is a continually grow-
ing problem in California. After examining recent developments
in the public beach area, this Comment discusses the effects of the
California Coastal Act of 1976 on public beach access and recrea-
tion. It also examines recent judicial decisions concerning public
beaches. The Comment concludes that the existing mechanisms
for protecting public coastal rights are inadequate and that a so-
lution to the problem will be forthcoming only when the legisla-
ture and the courts adopt a new attitude toward protection of this
limited resource.
It is my conviction that the shores of the United States are a part of the
common heritage of all the people, that they are impressed with a long-
standing public interest, and that new means must be found to protect
this great resource and make it available to the public.1
The California coastline is a distinct and valuable natural re-
source.2 One of the most distinctive features of such a coastline is
the use of its beaches for public recreation.3 In recent years, how-
ever, the shortage of public recreational beaches has become criti-
cal. Less than forty percent of California's 1,072 miles of coastline4
is publicly owned.5 Only 234 miles of the publicly owned coastline
is composed of sandy beach suitable for public recreation,6 and
only 110.2 miles of this sandy beach is considered suitable for
1. Jackson, Foreword to D. DucsEx, SHORELINE FOR TE PuBLIc at xv (1974).
2. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 30001 (West 1977).
3. 'There is probably no custom more universal, more natural or more an-
cient, on the sea-coasts, not only of the United States, but of the world, than that
of bathing in the salt waters of the ocean and the enjoyment of the wholesome rec-
reation incident thereto." White v. Hughes, 139 Fla. 54, 58-59, 190 So. 446, 448-49
(1939).
4. This figure does not include San Francisco Bay and 397 miles of island
shoreline. CALIFORNIA COASTAL ZONE CONSERVATION COMuMssIONs, ANNUAL RE-
PORT 1974, at 4 (1974).
5. Only 410 of the 1,072 miles of coastline in California are in public own-
ership. Id. The following table provides a breakdown of California coastline own-
ership:
Private: 662 miles (approximately 61 per cent)
Public: 410 miles (approximately 39 per cent)





6. SAN DIEGO COAST REGIONAL COMMIssION, RECREATION 49 (1974).
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swimmring.7
The demand for this limited resource is great and continually
growing. Approximately eighty-four percent of California's twenty
million residents live within thirty miles of the shoreline. 8 This
population, combined with the ever-increasing number of tourists
wishing to enjoy the beaches, puts an increasing strain on the
available coastal resources. The number of recreation days 9 spent
at California beaches is expected to increase from 127 million in
1970 to 177 million in 1980-an increase of thirty-nine percent in
ten years.'0
The public's right to the use of the water and the foreshore"
for public purposes12 is protected by the California Constitution,13
statutory provision,14 and common law trust doctrine.15 However,
the public's ability to make use of this right for recreational pur-
poses is dependent not only on a public right to use the water but
also on a public right to use the adjacent beaches and shores to
gain access to the water.' 6 Mere provision for public access to the
7. Id.
8. CALIFORNIA COASTAL ZONE CONSERVATION COMMISSIONS, ANNUAL REPORT
1974, at 4 (1974).
9. A recreation day is a statistical unit of recreation use, consisting of a
visit by one person for all or a portion of one 24-hour period. One recrea-
tion day may consist of one or several activity days by the same person. A
recreation day would merely reflect the attendance at a given area.
SAN DIEsCo COAST REGIONAL CoMMIssION, RECREATION 1 n.1 (1974).
10. Id. at 1.
11. The foreshore is the land which is "covered and uncovered by the daily
flux and reflux of the tides." City of Oakland v. Oakland Water Front Co., 118 Cal.
160, 182, 50 P. 277, 285 (1897). This area is often referred to as the "tidelands area."
12. Public purpose has been found to include "the right to fish, hunt, bathe,
swim, to use for boating and general recreation purposes the navigable waters of
the state for anchoring, standing or other purposes." Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d
251, 259, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 796 (1971).
13. No individual, partnership, or corporation, claiming or possessing the
frontage or tidal lands of a harbor, bay, inlet, estuary, or other navigable
water in this State, shall be permitted to exclude the right of way to such
water whenever it is required for any public purpose, nor to destroy or ob-
struct the free navigation of such water; and the Legislature shall enact
such laws as will give the most liberal construction to this provision, so
that access to the navigable waters of this State shall be always attainable
for the people thereof.
CAL. CONST. art. X, § 4.
14. "Except where the grant under which the land is held indicates a different
intent, the owner of the upland, when it borders on tidewater, takes to ordinary
high-water mark... ." CAL. Civ. CODE § 830 (West 1954).
15. With few exceptions, ownership of the foreshore, as public land, is in the
state and is held in trust for the people. 3 AMERIcAN LAw Or PROPERTY § 12.27, at
248-51 (A. Casner ed. 1952). For an extensive discussion of the public trust doc-
trine, see Note, California's Tidelands Trust for Modifiable Public Purposes, 6
LoY. LAJ. REv. 485 (1973).
16. This problem was recognized over 40 years ago:
The littoral owner not only may forbid public crossing of his land to the
shore, but also... , he has a private nght to cross the foreshore to the
1242
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foreshore, however, is not enough if the public is to extract the
full recreational benefit from the coastline. The dry sand area, be-
tween the mean high tide' and vegetation lines,'8 is a necessary
recreational adjunct to the water and to the foreshore. For the
public to obtain full recreational value from the coastline, there-
fore, it must have both the right of access to the water and the
right to use the dry sand area.
Public recreational use of the beaches erodes the private prop-
erty interest of the littoral property owner. As a general proposi-
tion, there are no public rights in the privately owned land
adjacent to navigable waters. 19 The private littoral landowner is
afforded this protection by both the United States20 and the Cali-
fornia Constitutions,21 which prohibit the taking of private prop-
erty for public purposes without just compensation.
This Comment examines thQ conflict between the public's need
for recreational access to the coast and the private littoral-owner's
right to preserve and to protect his property. In particular, the
California Coastal Act of 1976 22 is investigated, and its effective-
ness in protecting and in enhancing the public's rights in the
coastline is assessed. In addition, alternative methods of protect-
ing the public's right to the coastline are examined. An examina-
tion of the judicial remedies of implied dedication and custom
water himself. In this way subdivision projects form Beach Clubs or the
like, with virtual claim of monopoly; an increase of privatism over commu-
nism which finds expression in signs "Private Beach, Public Not Al-
lowed."
Wiel, Natural Communism" Air, Water, Oi4 Sea, and Seashore, 47 HARv. L. REV.
425, 452 (1934).
17. The "mean high tide" is the average of all the high waters at a place over a
period of 18.6 years. Borax Consol. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 26-27 (1935).
For a discussion of the significance of the mean high tide line, see Maloney & Aus-
ness, The Use and Legal Significance of the Mean High Water Line in Coastal
Boundary Mappings, 53 N.C. I. REV. 185 (1974).
18. The vegetation line is the extreme seaward boundary of natural vegetation
spreading continuously inland. It is a visible boundary, marking the border be-
tween the dry sand and the adjoining upland. Note, Public Access to Beaches, 22
STAN. I REV. 564, 565 n.9 (1970).
19. Stone, Public Rights in Water Uses, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 222-23
(R. Clark ed. 1967).
20. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. The prohibition against taking private lands without
compensation has been held to apply to the states by reason of the fourteenth
amendment. Chicago, Burlington & Quincey RIR v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-41
(1897).
21. CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 19.
22. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (West 1977).
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follows. Particular attention is focused on the effectiveness of
these remedies in providing public recreational opportunities on
the California coast.
THE COASTAL ACT
Since the early 1960's Californians have become increasingly
concerned about present and future threats to their state's shore-
line. In recognition of the need to protect the shoreline, the
California legislature enacted the California Coastal Act of 1976
(Coastal Act) . The primary purpose of the Coastal Act is provid-
ing for the creation of a comprehensive and an enforceable
management plan to "[alssure orderly, balanced utilization and
conservation of coastal zone resources." 24
In promoting this management purpose, the Coastal Act gener-
ally prohibits development in the coastal zone25 unless a permit
has been obtained from the state or the regional coastal conserva-
tion commission. The Coastal Act also establishes basic develop-
ment goals for the coastal region. These development goals
include preservation of agricultural resources, 26 preservation of
scenic and visual qualities of coastal areas, 27 concentration of de-
velopment, 28 preservation and enhancement of public access to
the coast,29 and enhancement of recreational opportunities.3 0
These final two goals, public access and recreation, are of primary
importance.
Public Access Under the Coastal Act
The controversy over the public's right of access to the coast is
one of the most formidable problems in implementing the policies
of the Coastal Act. Although the Coastal Act mandates maximum
access to the coast and recreational opportunities in the coastal
23. California Coastal Act of 1976, ch. 1330, 1976 Cal. Stats. 5951 (codified at
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (West 1977)). The 1976 Act was primarily a re-
enactment of the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972. The voters of
California enacted the latter Act through the initiative process. California Coastal
Zone Conservation Act of 1972, Initiative Measure 20 (Nov. 7, 1972) (codified at
CAL PUB. RES. CODE §§ 27000-27650 (West Supp. 1973)) (repealed 1977). For a dis.
cussion of the passage of Proposition 20, see S. SCOTr, GOVERNING CALoRNIA's
COAST (1975).
24. CAL. Pu . RES. CODE § 30001.5(b) (West 1977).
25. The "coastal zone" extends inland generally 1,000 yards from the mean
high tide line. Id. § 30103.
26. Id. § 30242.
27. Id. § 30251.
28. Id. § 30250.
29. Id. §§ 30001.5, 30211.
30. Id. §§ 30001.5, 30221.
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zone,31 there has been ardent disagreement over the extent of
this mandate. The most formidable challenge is determining how
public rights to use the coast can be protected without infringing
upon private property rights.
The Coastal Act clearly states that development in the coastal
zone cannot interfere with public access to the sea acquired
through use or through legislative authorization.32 Following this
declaration the Coastal Act becomes less explicit. It states that:
"[P] ublic access from the nearest public roadway to the shoreline
and along the coast shall be provided in new development
projects except where ... (2) adequate access exists nearby
.... "33 This section of the Coastal Act also places an important
condition on the acquisition of public access by stating that "dedi-
cated accessways shall not be required to be opened to public use
until a public agency or private association agrees to accept re-
sponsibility for maintenance and liability of the accessway."34
The provisions above leave a number of problems unanswered
in the public access controversy. First, the California Coastal
Zone Conservation Commission (Coastal Commission) recog-
nizes two types of beach access: lateral access along the beach
and transverse access to the beach from upland areas. 35 This rec-
ognition reflects the basic goal of keeping all dry sand areas open
to the public over the entire length of the coastline. The Coastal
Commission has not, however, devised a workable definition of
"new development project." It could decide that any new project,
such as improvements to a single-family residence, qualifies as a
"new development project." If the Coastal Commission were to in-
31. The Legislature further finds and declares that the basic goals of the
state for the coastal zone are to:
(c) Maximize public access to and along the coast and maximize pub-
lic recreational opportunities in the coastal zone consistent with sound re-
sources conservation principles and constitutionally protected rights of
private property owners.
Id. § 30001.5.
32. Id. § 30211.
33. Id. § 30212. Section 30212 also provides for exceptions where public access
would be inconsistent with public safety, military security needs, or the protection
of fragile coastal resources, and where providing public access would adversely af-
fect agriculture. Id.
34. Id.
35. CoMPREHENsIvE PLANNING ORGANIZATION FOR THE SAN DIEGO REGION, INI-
TIAL COASTLINE PLAN 19 (1974).
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terpret this term broadly, it could require both transverse and lat-
eral access over many projects lying between the nearest public
road and the beach, and it could require lateral access over other
beachfront projects. Such an interpretation would likely produce
criticism because of uncertainty and inequities to the property
owners who would have to provide access without being justly
compensated merely because they filed for permits. However, a
narrower reading could prevent the Coastal Commission from
truly maximizing public access.
The Coastal Commission also has not resolved the problem of
what constitutes "adequate access nearby" or the problem of find-
ing someone to assume the responsibility for maintenance and for
liability of the accessway. Only with answers to these problems
will the public access provisions be clearly defined.
Public Recreation Under the Coastal Act
The Coastal Act does not confine itself to the public access
mandate but also seeks to preserve and to enhance public recrea-
tional opportunities on the coast.36 Implicit in the public's right to
use the coast for recreational purposes is the right to gain access
to the beaches.
The Coastal Act expressly provides that: "[O]ceanfront land
suitable for recreational use shall be protected for recreational
use and development. . .. -37 The protection of recreational land
is limited to the situation where it is found that present and fu-
ture demand for recreational activities for which the property is
suited is already adequately provided for in the area.38 Coastal
Act protection of lands suitable for recreational use does not stop
on the beaches but continues into the "[u]pland areas necessary
to support coastal recreational uses."3 9 How this policy will be in-
terpreted is uncertain.
One possible interpretation is prohibiting the development of
coastal areas suitable for recreation in any way that fails to pro-
mote and to protect the recreational value of the land. To accom-
plish this goal the Coastal Commission, or some other appropriate
entity, could restrict the development of these lands to commer-
cial recreation development. Legal precedent can be found to sup-
port such restrictions. In McCarthy v. City of Manhattan Beach,40
the California Supreme Court upheld a local zoning ordinance re-
36. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 30001.5 (West 1977).
37. Id. § 30221.
38. Id.
39. These areas "shall be reserved for such uses, where feasible." Id. § 30223.
40. 41 Cal. 2d 879, 264 P.2d 932 (1953).
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stricting the use of the plaintiff's beachfront property to beach
recreational activities. The ordinance restricted all building on the
property other than the construction of lifeguard towers, open
smooth curve fence, and small signs. Because the plaintiff was al-
lowed to charge an admission fee to visitors, the supreme court
recognized that he was not deprived of every economic use of the
land.4 1 Therefore, plaintiff's claimed economic loss was insuffi-
cient to invalidate the ordinance.42 Regardless of precedent, if the
Coastal Commission were to adopt a development restriction
along the entire coastline similar to the one in McCarthy, numer-
ous inverse condemnation suits would surely follow. In HFH, Ltd.
v. Superior Court,43 the California Supreme Court explicitly rec-
ognized that an action for inverse condemnation is proper where
a land use regulation prohibits substantially all use of the land in
question.4
It appears, therefore, that the Coastal Commission can go so far
as to restrict the owner's use of his property to preserve its recre-
ational nature. The only possible limitation on this power is that
the regulation cannot prohibit substantially all use of the prop-
erty. In light of the court's propensity to find that some reason-
able use is available, 45 this limitation seems minimal.
This conclusion does not mean that land use regulation could
be used to give the public the right to use private property. It has
been found that where a zoning ordinance was enacted to allow
actual public use of a landowner's property, an action for inverse
condemnation was proper. 6 Therefore, although it is possible to
41. Id. at 892, 264 P.2d at 939.
42. 'The fact that plaintiffs may suffer some financial detriment does not re-
quire invalidation of the zoning restriction, for 'every exercise of the police power
is apt to affect adversely the property interest of somebody."' Id. at 890, 264 P.2d
at 938 (quoting Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 497, 512, 234 P. 388, 394
(1925)).
43. 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975).
44. Regardless of this judicial recognition of the right to recover for inverse
condemnation, this author is aware of no reported California appellate case up-
holding a claim of constitutionally compelled compensation as against a land use
regulation. As one study has concluded, "[t]he 'myth' of the taking clause has al-
ways lured landowners to expect more from it than prior precedents really jus-
tify." F. BOSSZLMA", D. CALLTs, & J. BANTA, THE TANG IssUE 232 (1973).
45. McCarthy v. City of Manhattan Beach, 41 Cal. 2d 879, 264 P.2d 932 (1953).
46. Sneed v. County of Riverside, 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1963).
See HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365
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preserve recreational areas through land use regulation, such reg-
ulation is not sufficient to create a public right to use these areas.
Coastal Act Mechanisms Providing Access
The Coastal Act provides a permit procedure for the protection
and the enhancement of public access to and recreation in the
coastal area. The permit procedure can be used in two ways to
protect the public's interest in the coast. First, through the use of
subdivision exactions, public accessways can be secured through
new development. Second, the Coastal Commission can use the
permit requirement as a holding mechanism to preserve for fu-
ture acquisitions as open space.
Subdivision Exactions
New coastal development provides an apt occasion to use land
use controls for the preservation and the acquisition of public
beach access. This proposition is especially true in light of the
Coastal Act's directive that new development "shall not interfere
with the public's right of access to the sea."47 Conditional ap-
proval of development plans in the preconstruction stage is the
primary regulatory method employed by the Coastal Commis-
sion.48 The requirement of commission approval of development
plans provides the Coastal Commission with limited control over
the developer. The Coastal Commission can use this control to
obtain a public easement through any planned development
which threatens to block access to the beach.49 There have been
few challenges to the Coastal Commission's authority to require a
public access easement through new developments.50 The ques-
tion still remains, however, whether a requirement of dedicating
property for public access to a beach should be considered a tak-
ing without compensation where the requirement is imposed as a
condition precedent to obtaining a coastal-zone permit.
(1975), where the California Supreme Court recognized that this circumstance
could properly give rise to inverse condemnation.
47. CAL PuB. RES. CODE § 30211 (West 1977).
48. For a discussion of subdivision control, see Heyman & Gilhool, The Consti-
tutionality of Imposing Increased Community Costs on New Suburban Residents
Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119 (1964).
49. No local agency shall approve either the tentative or the final map of
any subdivision fronting upon the coastline or shoreline which subdivision
does not provide or have available reasonable public access by fee or
easement from public highways to land below the ordinary high water
mark on any ocean coastline or bay shoreline within or at a reasonable
distance from the subdivision.
CAL. Gov'r CODE § 66478.11(a) (West Supp. 1976).
50. Apparently, most developers feel that the dedication of an accessway is a
small price to pay for approval of their permit applications.
1248
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Subdivision controls, as exercises of the state's police power,
must be reasonably related to the health, safety, and general wel-
fare of the public.51 Requiring public beach acccess is analogous
to the requirement of park dedication. Park dedication has gener-
ally been upheld by the courts as noncompensable acquisitions
by the local governing body.52 Furthermore, a requirement that
park lands or fees in lieu of land be dedicated to public use has
been upheld as a requirement for approval.53
One writer has suggested that where subdivisions would block
existing or potential shore access, a requirement that developers
dedicate public easements would fit within the existing statutory
framework.54 The rationale is as follows:
Requiring beach access is analogous to requiring streets of the width
made necessary by a citywide traffic flow. While it is true that most of the
demand for access comes from areas outside the subidivision, the exist-
ence of the subdivision aggravates the beach-access problem. First, it may
cut off existing access to the beaches; second, even where no access previ-
ously existed, the new development will raise land values and create a
pattern of land use that will make it more difficult and expensive to
purchase beach easements in the future.55
Although this rationale seems pervasive where land that is to be
used for access purposes is dedicated, it is doubtful whether the
argument can be extended to the use of the shorefront itself.
Where the public is attempting to obtain the use of the beach, the
rational nexus between the exaction and the public need created
by the development is difficult to establish. The development, in
most cases, will not create a greater public need for beach areas
because in areas other than where a pattern of previous public
use can be shown, the area in question will have been used as pri-
vate'property. The public may, therefore, face a situation where
access to the water is available through the new development, but
the right to use the shoreline is restricted to the wet-sand area.
51. See Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Com-
munity Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73
YALE LJ. 1119 (1964).
52. 2 AssocLm4 oN OF BAY AREA GOV'TS, HOW To IMPLEMENT OPEN SPACE
PLANs 23 (1973).
53. Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d
606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971).
54. Note, Public Access to Beaches, 22 STAN. L. REV. 564, 568-69 (1970).
55. Id. at 571.
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Holding Device
Only through a more radical use of the permit procedure might
the Coastal Commission have the opportunity to preserve coastal
recreation areas for public use. A possible solution is to use the
permit procedure as a holding device to preserve temporarily the
status quo of certain coastal property. To accomplish this solu-
tion, the Coastal Commission could temporarily deny any permit
applications where the development would threaten recreational
resources until local authorities develop a comprehensive plan for
the region.
Support can be found for this proposition in State v. Superior
Court.56 In this case, a developer proposed a development for its
property. The Coastal Commission denied the developer's request
for a coastal permit. The developer subsequently filed an action
asserting that the Coastal Commission had denied the permit so
that "its land would 'remain undeveloped and devoted to, and
held for, public use as open space.' "17 The developer contended
that the denial of the permit on this ground constituted a taking
of its property. The California Supreme Court rejected this con-
tention and noted that because the requirement for a permit was
only a temporary measure, to be used until a coastal-zone plan
could be adopted, the denial of a permit to the developer did not
constitute inverse condemnation.5 8 The court stated that "even
more severe restrictions on the use of private property than those
provided by the [Coastal] Act have been supported as a valid ex-
ercise of the police power pending the adoption of a comprehen-
sive zoning ordinance."59
This California Supreme Court ruling is one of the strongest af-
firmations of the Coastal Commission's liberal use of its permit
authority during the interim planning period.60 By using this
grant of authority, the Coastal Commission could restrict the de-
velopment of coastal property suitable for recreational use until
local governments are given the opportunity to determine how
the land could best be used.61 To date, however, it does not ap-
56. 12 Cal. 3d 237, 524 P.2d 1281, 115 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1974).
57. Id. at 252, 524 P.2d at 1291, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
58. Id. at 253, 524 P.2d at 1292, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
59. Id. at 255, 524 P.2d at 1292, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 508. E.g., Miller v. Board of Pub.
Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925) (prohibiting construction of four-family dwell-
ing in residential district until comprehensive zoning plan enacted); Hunter v. Ad.
ams, 180 Cal. App. 2d 511, 4 Cal. Rptr. 776 (1960) (moratorium on the issuance of
building permits upheld).
60. See also CEEED v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 43 Cal.
App. 3d 306, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1974) (temporary restriction on the use of property
pending the adoption of a comprehensive plan does not compel compensation).
61. In Schreffler v. State Coastal Comm'n, No. 74849 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 23,
1250
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pear that the Coastal Commission has adopted such a broad view
of its permit authority.
Preserving access and recreational beach areas through the
permit procedure, whether by subdivision exaction or by open
space control, has several advantages. It is inexpensive because it
forces developers, rather than the general public, to pay the initial
costs. Also, it does not require proof of prior public use. The pri-
mary disadvantage of the permit procedure is that it applies only
to land facing immediate development. Because of this require-
ment, developers claim the method is too uncertain and too ineq-
uitable to property owners. Also, this limitation prevents the
Coastal Commission from developing a planned series of access-
ways and recreational areas. Instead, the Coastal Commission is
forced to work on a piecemeal basis until local governments com-
plete local coastal programs including public access and public
recreation components. Thus, the permit procedure is only a par-
tial remedy. The inquiry must now turn to the remedies available
outside the Coastal Act's boundaries.
THE COASTAL CONSERVANCY
While the Coastal Act was under consideration, need for the es-
tablishment of a new state agency with the power and the funding
to implement the important policies of the Coastal Act was recog-
nized. The California legislature thus enacted the State Coastal
Conservancy Act (Conservancy Act)62 contemporaneously with
the Coastal Act. The Conservancy Act brought into existence the
State Coastal Conservancy (Conservancy). The Conservancy is a
new state agency, consisting of five members,63 which is empow-
ered to make various land acquisitions in the coastal area with
the assistance of the State Department of Parks and Recreation
(Department).
1974), the plaintiff brought a mandate action challenging the granting of a permit
subject to the condition that no construction could take place for one year, during
which public entities would have the opportunity to acquire the property for recre-
ational use. The court upheld the permit and the condition, and the plaintiff did
not appeal.
62. State Coastal Conservancy Act, ch. 1441, 1976 Cal. Stats. 6489 (codified at
CAr. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 31000-31406 (West 1977)).
63. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 31100 (West 1977).
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The primary function of the Conservancy is to augment the
planning program established under the Coastal Act by acquiring
a land bank that achieves certain specified goals. Among these
goals are preservation of agricultural land,64 implementation of
coastal restoration projects,65 implementation of coastal resource
enhancement projects, 66 development of resource protection
zones, 67 preservation of significant coastal resource areas,68 and
creation of a system of public accessways to the coast throughout
the entire coastal zone.69
To begin implementation of these goals, the legislature has
funded the Conservancy with an initial 1978 budget of ten million
dollars.70 Although this sum of money is insufficient to purchase
fee interests in a significant amount of coastal resources, the Con-
servancy is empowered to acquire property interests other than
in fee. Through the use of limited types of land acquisitions, such
as the purchase of options or easements, the power of the Conser-
vancy to effectuate coastal programs is dramatically increased.
One of the primary goals of the Conservancy Act is to provide a
statewide system of public accessways to the coast.71 To imple-
ment this policy, the Conservancy is empowered to provide fund-
ing "up to the total cost of the acquisition of interests in lands and
the initial development of public accessways by the depart-
ment."72 With Conservancy funds the Department is entitled to
acquire fee title or lesser interests in coastal lands and to develop
and to maintain areas required for public access to coastal re-
sources.73 Once the Department has acquired an interest in an ac-
cessway, it must then search for the appropriate local public
agency to accept responsibility for maintenance and for liability
for the accessway.74 After this is accomplished, the Department
may then lease the accessway to the local agency.7 5 The Conser-
vancy Act does not appear, however, to require the local agency
to accept responsibility for the accessway. In the event a local
agency refuses to accept this responsibility, the power remains
with the Department to develop and to maintain the accessway.
64. Id. §§ 31150-31155.
65. Id. §§ 3120031215.
66. Id. §§ 31251-31265.
67. Id. §§ 31300-31306.
68. Id. §§ 31350-31356.
69. Id. §§ 31400-31406.
70. STATE COASTAL REPORT, October, 1977, at 6.
71. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 31400 (West 1977).
72. Id. § 31400.2.
73. Id. § 31402.
74. Id. § 31404.
75. Id.
1252
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There are three practical benefits of obtaining public access
through the use of the Conservancy Act. First, the Conservancy
can use its funds to purchase and develop accessways for present
public use.7 6 When Conservancy funds are used, there is no need
to delay the purchase of accessways until a development is pro-
posed, as would be necessary with the permit procedure. The
Conservancy thus has the advantage of being able aggressively to
plan coastal access. Second, the Conservancy can use its funds to
purchase limited interests in coastal lands as an interim measure
to prevent development until additional funds are available to
purchase and develop the accessway. Finally, the Conservancy
Act protects the private landowner by assuring him just compen-
sation for lands taken.
The Conservancy Act does not solve the access and recreation
problem. First, the Conservancy funding is inadequate to create
accessways along the entire coastline. This inadequacy is espe-
cially true because Conservancy funds are also to be used to im-
plement other coastal policies. Futhermore, the Coastal Act only
provides for the acquisition of access over private land: It makes
no provision for providing the public with the use of private
coastal land for recreational purposes.
With adequate funding and a creative use of its land acquisi-
tion powers, the Conservancy has the potential of becoming an
important force in coastal land use regulation. However, until this
potential is realized, the public must turn to the judiciary for sup-
port.
JuDIcIAL REMEDIES
As is often the case with politically sensitive issues, the judici-
ary was the first to respond to the public demand for increased
shoreline recreation areas. This response resulted in the applica-
tion of existing real-property doctrines to the beach situation. The
judiciary relied primarily upon the doctrines of implied dedica-
76. Id. § 31402.
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tion, custom, and prescription.77
Implied Dedication
Dedication is generally defined as "the devotion of property to
a public use by an unequivocal act of the owner, manifesting an
intention that it shall be accepted and used presently or in the fu-
ture."78 For complete dedication, both the intention of the owner
to offer land or some interest therein and acceptance by the pub-
lic must exist. Both the offer and the acceptance may be either
express or implied. The concept is probably best summarized as
follows:
Common law implied dedication comprises a system of judicially cre-
ated doctrines governing the donation of land to public use. No formalities
are necessary; conduct showing intent by the owner to dedicate land and
an acceptance by the public completes the dedication. Both intent to dedi-
cate and acceptance may be implied from public use. An owner's inaction
may be taken as evidence of acquiescence in public use and thus of his
intent to donate the land. The public use itself may be taken as evidence
of acceptance.79
Once there has been a completed dedication, the public's rights
cannot be lost through non-use or through adverse possession. As
a general rule, the public normally takes only an easement by im-
plied dedication, with the underlying fee remaining with the own-
er.8 0
Prior to the 1960's, cities made a number of unsuccessful at-
tempts to apply the dedication concept to beach problems.81 Al-
though courts allowed dedication to acquire public interests in
roadways, these early cases found that beaches were subject to
an "open land limitation" presuming that public use was under a
revocable license from the owner. In the 1960's, however, as the
shortage of public beach space became increasingly troublesome,
77. This discussion excludes the doctrine of public prescriptive rights in prop-
erty because of the longstanding California rule that the public may not take pre-
scriptive easements in land. People v. Sayig, 101 Cal. App. 2d 890, 226 P.2d 702
(1951). The Florida courts have used prescription in the beach situation. City of
Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 271 So. 2d 765 (Fla. Ct. App. 1972). For a discus-
sion of prescription in the beach context, see Comment, Easements: Judicial and
Legislative Protection of the Public's Rights in Florida's Beaches, 25 U. FLA. L
REv. 586 (1973).
78. 11 E. McQUILLIn, THE LAW OF MuNicnAL CORORATIONS § 33.02 (3d ed. rev.
1977).
79. Note, Public Access to Beaches, 22 STAN. L. REV. 564, 573 (1970).
80. The holding in Washington Blvd. Beach Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 38 Cal.
App. 2d 135, 100 P.2d 828 (1940), is an exception to this general rule: The court
found dedication of a fee simple-title. However, this case involved evidence other
than mere public use.
81. E.g., City of Manhattan Beach v. Cortelyou, 10 Cal. 2d 653, 76 P.2d 483
(1938); F.A. Hihn Co. v. City of Santa Cruz, 170 Cal. 436, 150 P. 62 (1915).
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dedication began to be viewed in a new light.82
In 1970, California saw its first successful implementation of
the dedication doctrine to beach areas. In Gion v. City of Santa
Cr=z, 83 a consolidation of two cases, the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia applied the concept of dedication to the beach situation. In
the first case, the plaintiff owned beach property which was both
level and cliff-like at the edge of the sea. The land was unim-
proved and had been used by the public since 1900 to fish, swim,
park, and picnic, as well as for viewing, "without any significant
objection by the fee owners" 84 for several years. One prior owner
testified that he posted private property signs, but they were
quickly torn down or blown away.85 After 1941, the City of Santa
Cruz had taken an active interest in the property, improving it for
public use. In the second consolidated case, plaintiffs, as repre-
sentatives of the public, sought to enjoin the defendant land-
owner from blocking an unimproved road providing access to the
beach. The beach and the road were on property owned by the
defendant but had been used by the public "for at least 100
years."8 6 Some of the owners of adjacent land had attempted to
collect a toll for use of the road, but such efforts were sporadic
and ineffectual. Defendant's grantors testified that they had en-
couraged the public to use the beach.87 The California Supreme
Court granted a recreational easement in both cases on the fol-
lowing ground.
[C]ommon law dedication of property to the public can be proved either
by showing acquiescence of the owner in use of the land under circum-
stances that negate the idea that the use is under a license or by estab-
lishing open and continuous use by the public for the prescriptive period.
When dedication by acquiescence for a period of less than five years is
claimed, the owner's actual consent to the dedication must be proved. ...
When, on the other hand, a litigant seeks to prove dedication by adverse
use, the inquiry shifts from the intent and activities of the owner to those
of the public.88
Because adverse public use was well established in both of these
cases, the court was able to avoid the problem of dealing with the
82. Dedication was first successfully used in a "beach case" in Seaway Co. v.
Attorney Gen., 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Ct. App. 1964).
83. 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970).
84. Id. at 34, 465 P.2d at 53, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 36, 465 P.2d at 54, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 166.
87. Id. at 37, 465 P.2d at 55, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 167.
88. Id. at 38, 465 P.2d at 55-56, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 167-68.
1255
owners' intent to dedicate. Finally, the Gion decision removed
the "beach cases" from the restrictions of the "open lands limita-
tion."89
Gion sparked a wave of law review commentaries9 0 on this new
expansion of implied dedication, most of which were critical.91
One writer viewed the decision as a major alteration of California
real property law.92 The impact was purportedly "felt by the [Cal-
ifornia] Legislature, the bar, private landowners, the land title in-
dustry, and the public at large."9 3
Law review commentators were not the only ones responding
to the decision. Private landowners were reported to be taking
quick steps to prevent dedication of their property. The following
is an example of steps taken:
On the Palos Verdes peninsula in Los Angeles County, major land own-
ers have recently erected a 7-foot high fence topped by three strands of
barbed wire in order to keep the public from reaching the beach by cross-
ing their property. It is believed that other owners in that area have dyna-
mited paths leading to the water. In Orange County, one land owner has
erected a large fence with cactus planted at its base to discourage barefoot
access to the beach over his property. Land formerly used for parking and
beach access in San Mateo County is being vigorously plowed to deter un-
authorized users.94
The California legislature also took steps to protect private land-
owners by enacting statutes making it more difficult for the pub-
lic to show dedication.9 5 This legislative action did not, however,
affect any dedication which had already taken place.
89. We will not presume that owners of property today knowingly permit
the general public to use their lands and &rant a license to the public to do
so. For a fee owner to negate a finding of intent to dedicate based on unin-
terrupted public use for more than five years, therefore, he must either af-
firmatively prove that he has grantedthe public a license to use his
property or demonstrate that he has made a bona fide attempt to prevent
public use.
Id. at 41, 465 P.2d at 57, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
90. Berger, Nice Guys Finish Last-At Least They Lose Their Property: Gion v.
City of Santa Cruz, 8 CAL W.L. REV. 75 (1971); Shavelson, Gion v. City of Santa
Cruzx Where Do We Go From Here?, 47 CAL. ST. B.J. 414 (1972); Note, Implied Dedi-
cation in California: A Need for Legislative Reform, 7 CAL. W1. REV. 259 (1970);
Note, Public Access to Beaches, 22 STAN. L. REV. 564 (1970); Comment, Public or
Private Ownership of Beaches: An Alternative to Implied Dedication, 18 U.C.LJ.
L, REV. 795 (1971).
91. Berger, Nice Guys Finish Last--At Least They Lose Their Property: Gion v.
City of Santa Cruz, 8 CAT. WI. REV. 75 (1971); Note, Implied Dedication in Cali-
fornia: A Need for Legislative Reform, 7 CAL. W.L. REV. 259 (1970); Comment, Pub-
lic or Private Ownership of Beaches: An Alternative to Implied Dedication, 18
U.C.LA. L, Rv. 795 (1971).
92. Shavelson, Gion v. City of Santa Cruz: Where Do We Go From Here?, 47
CA. ST. B.J. 414 (1972).
93. Id. at 415.
94. Berger, Nice Guys Finish Last--At Least They Lose Their Property: Gion v.
City of Santa Cruz, 8 CAL. W. REV. 75, 75 (1971).
95. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1009 (West Supp. 1978).
1256
[voL 15: 1241, 1978] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
The effect of Gion in the judicial arena apparently has been
less than was originally anticipated. Only one appellate level
beach case has been reported in California in the seven-year pe-
riod since Gion.96 Even at the trial level, the activity has been
less than initially anticipated.
In the lone reported case, County of Orange v. Chandler-Sher-
man Corp.,97 a California appellate court affirmed a lower court
finding that a section of beach had not been dedicated. This case
involved a beach in Orange County called Dana Strand. Dana
Strand is a long, narrow, sandy beach, near the coastal highway
and sheltered by steep cliffs. Defendant and its predecessors in
interest owned both the bluffs and the beach. The record showed
that prior to an undisclosed date in the 1930's there had been un-
restricted use of the beach. From the 1930's until the early 1940's
the beach was operated as a "somewhat tacky beach camp. .. ,
charging fees to some users although [its] operation could chari-
tably be characterized as sloppy."9 8 From 1946 to 1956, there was
again comparatively unrestricted use of the beach, although the
owner did make some ineffectual attempts to restrict the public.
After 1956, the owner completely restricted public use.
During the years that use was unrestricted, the beach was used
for "surfing, fishing, swimming, picnicking and sunbathing."99 The
use during this time, however, was limited to small numbers of
people, rarely exceeding fifteen on the beach at any one time.
The court upheld a finding that no dedication to the public had
taken place. The court found that while the use was of a long-
term nature it was neither major nor substantial. The court did
not find that only a limited and definable group of persons used
the beach. Rather, it found that the use in terms of mere numbers
was insufficient to constitute "use as a public recreational
area."'o
The court's decision appears to have placed a quantitative limit
on the application of implied dedication. However, Gion did not
deal in numbers. Instead, the Gion court required only a showing
96. County of Orange v. Chandler-Sherman Corp., 54 Cal. App. 3d 561, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 765 (1976).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 565, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
99. Id. at 566, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
100. Id.
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that the public had used the beach as a public area and that this
use was by various groups of persons as opposed to use by a "lim-
ited and definable number of persons."o' In Gion 'the thing of
significance is that whoever wanted to use the land did so ...
when they wished to do so without asling permission and without
protest from the land owners."10 2
Although the Chandler-Sherman court did not find that use
had been restricted to a "limited and definable number of per-
sons," it did require an additional showing of substantial public
use. If a showing of substantial public use is required in future
"beach cases," it will have a chilling effect on those who are con-
templating suits based on Gion. The problem of proving substan-
tial use, especially in relatively isolated areas of the state, could
be insurmountable. For the coast landowner, however, this deci-
sion may remove fears that "mere" public use for five years
would be enough to show a dedication.
Other than the Chandler-Sherman case and the few isolated
"beach cases" arising immediately after Gion,10 3 the public has
made very little use of implied dedication to obtain public
beaches. A survey of county counsel and district attorneys for
each of California's coastal counties indicates that no recent
"beach cases" have been initiated by any of their offices.l0 4 In
fact, the respondents to the survey revealed that their offices not
only had not been involved in any recent implied dedication
cases, but that to their knowledge no other public group has initi-
ated any such case.
The only exception to this general lack of activity has been in
Orange County. The Orange County Counsel's Office was respon-
sible for the prosecution of the Chandler-Sherman case, and it
has also recently been involved in two similar actions.105 How-
ever, because the parties were able to settle "at a price favorable
to the public," neither of these actions reached the trial stage.10
101. 2 Cal. 3d at 39, 465 P.2d at 56, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 168.
102. Id. at 40, 465 P.2d at 56-57, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 168-69.
103. Comment, Public or Private Ownership of Beaches: An Alternative to Im-
plied Dedication, 18 U.C.L.A L REv. 795, 799 n.28 (1971).
104 At the time of this writing responses had been received from the following
offices: Monterey County, County Counsel and District Attorney; San Luis Obispo
County, District Attorney; Ventura County, County Counsel; Marin County,
County Counsel; Del Norte County, County Counsel; Santa Barbara County,
County Counsel; Humboldt County, District Attorney; Sonoma County, County
Counsel; Los Angeles County, District Attorney. These responses are on file with
the San Diego Law Review.
105. Telephone interview with Arthur C. Wahlstedt, Jr., Deputy County Coun-
sel, Orange County (Oct. 20, 1977).
106. Id.
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Stated bluntly, the use of implied dedication allowed the county
to coerce the sale of beach property at a price favorable to the
public.
This coercive application of implied dedication could be its
most effective application. The threat of litigation could provide
the impetus for public representatives and landowners to reach
terms on reasonable prices for the purchase of public recreational
areas. If used equitably, this approach could allow the public to
obtain recreational beaches at an advantageous price while at the
same time providing the private landowner with some, although
admittedly not complete, compensation for his loss. However, the
possibility exists that the public will use implied dedication to ex-
tort property from the coastal landowner at an unreasonable
price, but this temptation should be tempered by the desire of the
public representative to avoid timely and expensive litigation over
the property. Therefore, the desire to avoid the litigation process
should encourage all parties involved to reach an equitable agree-
ment.
In retrospect, the seven years that have elapsed since the
landmark Gion decision reveal that implied dedication has only
limited success in providing the public with greater coastal recre-
ational opportunities. The cost of litigating numerous tract-by-
tract suits along the coastline, coupled with the unwillingness or
the inability of existing public agencies to initiate these suits, has
limited the practical usefulness of the doctrine.
Custom
The most expansive judicial approach utilized to provide public
access to beaches is the ancient doctrine of custom. Custom is de-
fined as "usage or practice of the people which, by common adop-
tion and acquiescence, and by long and invarying habit, has
become compulsory, and has acquired the force of a law with re-
spect to the place or subject-matter to which it relates.'10 7 Only
two states, Oregon' 08 and Hawaii,109 have used the custom doc-
trine to afford the public rights in beach property.
107. BLAci's LAW DICTIONARY 461 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
108. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969).
109. In re Ashford, 50 Hawaii 314, 440 P.2d 76 (1968).
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An Oregon case, State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, no involved a
suit by the state against a motel owner to prevent the defendant
from fencing off, for use by motel patrons, part of the beach to
which he held title. The Oregon Supreme Court found-
The dry-sand area... has been enjoyed by the general public as a rec-
reational adjunct of the wet-sand or foreshore area since the beginning of
the state's political history.... Thus, from the time of the earliest settle-
ment to the present day, the general public has assumed that the dry-sand
area was a part of the public beach, and the public has used the dry-sand
area for picnics, gathering wood, building warming fires, and generally as
a headquarters from which to supervise children or to range out over the
foreshore as the tides advance and recede.111
By adopting the custom approach, the court was able to avoid
tract-by-tract litigation by applying a uniform rule to all Oregon's
beaches.
Although uniform treatment of beaches is the chief advantage
of custom, a problem exists with custom's application to Califor-
nia's beaches. Custom is limited to those lands used by the public
from "time immemorial." This creates a difficult problem of proof.
It seems safe to assume that prior to achieving statehood Califor-
nia's Ihistory of beach use was similar to Oregon's. During this
early period, it is likely that both the natives and the early set-
tlers made unrestricted use of the beaches. The difficulty lies in
demonstrating a similarity of public usage since California be-
came a state. During this time, the California coastline has exper-
ienced more extensive development than has occurred in Oregon.
Because of the more extensive development, it could be difficult
to demonstrate that the general public has continually assumed
that the dry-sand area was a part of the public beach.
It may be possible, however, to demonstrate that the circum-
stances required to show a custom112 are present along certain
definable sections of California's coastline. For example, it could
be possible to prove that the necessary prerequisites to establish
a custom are present as to a particular community or section of
beach. A court then could adopt custom to preserve public rights
in that particular section of the coast.113 Used in this way, custom
110. 254 Or. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969).
111. Id. at 588, 462 P.2d at 673.
112. The circumstances necessary to show custom are as follows:
1 it must be ancient,
the right must be exercised without interruption,
3 use must be reasonable and peaceable,
S4) the boundaries of use must be certain, and.
5) the custom must be obligatory and not inconsistent with other cus-
toms or laws.
D. n ucs, SHoR Ln FoR TBE PuBLac 111 n.14 (1974).
113. This author is aware of no California decision that discusses the use of the
custom doctrine in California.
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would avoid the necessity of a tract-by-tract adjudication, at least
concerning that section of coastline.
The application of custom to a limited geographic area may be
more in keeping with the doctrine's ancient heritage. Originally, a
customary right arose in favor of a community's public and was
limited to a small geographic area.114 It was only with the Oregon
decision that custom was applied on a larger scale.115 Other
courts need not restrict the use of custom to statewide applica-
tion. Rather, a court faced with proper proof of custom in a lim-
ited area should be free to employ the doctrine to protect the
public rights in that area.
Both implied dedication and custom, at least superficially, have
great potential for preserving existing opportunities for public use
of the shoreline. However, the full potential of neither remedy has
been realized. Furthermore, a major problem with using these ju-
dicial remedies for recreational planning is that they are not re-
ally planning at all. The case-by-case adjudication of each stretch
of shoreline causes much uncertainty.
CONCLUSION
The Coastal Act provides what may be the last opportunity to
preserve the public's rights to enjoy California's coastline.
Through diligent planning and control of coastal development, the
remaining parcels of open coast can be preserved for public use.
At the same time, to meet the ever-increasing demand on Califor-
nia's beaches, the state must take an active role in enforcing
rights that have developed through public use. More importantly,
a new attitude toward limited resources must be developed. Land,
especially limited coastal land, must be considered a resource
rather than a mere commodity to be bought and sold. Otherwise,
all efforts to preserve limited resources are doomed to failure.
RICHARD H. ZnIMEEmAN
114. 6 R POWELz, TEE LAW OF REAL PnOPERTY § 934, at 362.5 n.5 (1968).
115. "Most of the customary rights recorded in English cases are local in
scope.... But it does not follow that a custom, established in fact, cannot have
regional application and be enjoyed by a larger public than the inhabitants of a
single village." State ex tel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 598 n.6, 462 P.2d 671, 678
n.6 (1969).
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